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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

CRAIG CARLSEN,

11884

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Craig Carlsen, appeals from his conviction of grand larceny in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
7G-38-4 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant, Craig Carlsen, was charged with the
crime of grand larceny by information filed in the First
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, in and for
Box Elder County. He was arraigned on February 21, 1969,
where he entered a plea of not guilty. Trial by jury commenced on May 7, 1969, and concluded the same day. The
jury found the defendant guilty of the crime charged in
the information. On May 27, 1969, the defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than ten years. The
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court granted stays of execution until August 14, 1969,
where the court again sentenced the defendant to the Utah
State Prison for a term of not less than one nor mo1:e tlia.1
ten years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the District
Cc.:nt :.hould be affirmed.
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
On January 5, 1969, Mr. Wallace A. Bowden, an employee of the Salt Lake Sanitation Treatment Plant at 650
West 3300 South in Salt Lake City, Utah, observed, while
at work, a panel truck and an automobile pull up at the
gate of the plant and transfer white meat packages from
the truck to the car. This observation was made with the
aid of field glasses. Mr. Bowden then telephoned the county
sheriff to report the suspicious conduct of the three defendants charged in the information. Minutes later, Mr. Earl
W. Julian of the County Sheriff's Office arrived at the
scene, investigated the conduct and placed the three men
under arrest.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANT WAS AT NO TIME DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF
TION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER
THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMEND-

MENTS OF THE UNITED ST ATES CONSTI1 UTlON.
The appellant contends that he was deprived of his
constitutional warning prior to incriminating statements
made by himself. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966), the Supreme Court of the United States held that
police must inform an individual of his constitutional rights
prior to interrogation, but same restrictions on the application of the holding were placed. In the instant case, Officer
Julian arrived at the scene of the suspicious conduct reported by Mr. Bowden and asked the appellant what he was
doing with the meat (Tr. 28). The appellant then answered
that the meat had been brought down from the Dale Olsen
Distributing Company for selling purposes (Tr. 28). It is
quite clear that at this point of the investigation by Officer
Julian, no right to a constitutional warning had arisen. It
was not clear, at that point of time, that the defendant had
committed a crime. There was merely sufficient evidence
to investigate further and the court in Miranda, directing
itself to that point, stated:
"General on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning
of citizens in the fact finding process is not affected
by our holding." Miranda v. Arizona, supra. (Emphasis added.)
In a similar case in the Second Circuit, United States
v. Thomas, 396 F. 2d 310 (2nd Cir. 1968), railroad policemen observed two suspects carrying cartons late at night
near a railroad yard. When stopped by the officers, the
two men made exculpatory statements which were later
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used in their conviction. The court in that case determined
that at that point in time no arrest had been made and that
no significant deprivation of freedom had occurred. The
court pointed to the fact that no restraining, frisking or
handcuffing had taken place and therefore under such circumstances, the questioning which related to where the defendants had obtained the cartons they were carrying, was
held to be on-the-scene questioning to determine if a crime
had been committed, and not a custodial interrogation.
In Jennings v. United States, 391 F. 2d 512 (5th Cir.
1968), a policeman was examining a parked automobile on
which a theft had been reported. The defendant approached
the officer and asked what the trouble was and at that point
the officer responded by asking the defendant if he owned
the car. The defendant stated that he was the owner and
produced a registration and drivers license which patently
did not belong to him. All of this was prior to arrest and
was determined by the court not to be a custodial interrogation.
In still another case, United States v. Gibson, 392 F.
2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968), an officer, knowing that the automobile in question may have been stolen, pursued defendant into a tavern, asked him to step outside, and there
proceeded to question defendant as to the ownership of the
car, all prior to a constitutional rights warning.
Therefore, the question asked by Officer Julian in the
instant case, was within the scope of on-the-scene questioning or routine investigation of circumstances of a suspicious nature to determine if a crime had been committed,
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and conse(1uently no warning of the defendant's constitul ional rights was, at that time, appropriate or required.

POINT II.
THE APPELLANT WAS AT NO TIME DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO COUNSEL UNDER THE S I X T H AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, it is true the court held
that an accused person does have the right to counsel when
he is first subjected to interrogation. Again, however, the
court in Miranda directed itself to the scope of its holding
in stating that on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding the crime or the general questioning of citizens in
theo fact finding process did not give rise to the rules relating to warnings and waivers. Therefore, for the same reasons as established in Point I of respondent's brief, the
a.ppellant was at no time denied his constitutional rights to
>rnrnings and waivers.

POINT III.
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADMONISH WITNESSES TO REMAIN SEPARATED WHEN EXCLUDED FR 0 M THE
COURTROOM.
The appellant alleges prejudicial error for the trial
court's failure to admonish witnesses excluded from court
and error by the trial court for failing to comply with Utah
Code Ann. § 77-15-12 (1953), which provides:
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"While a witness is under examinati1m, thP.
magistrate may exclude all witnesses who have not
been examined. He may also cause the witnesses
to be kept separate, and to be prevented from conversing with each other until they have all been
examined." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant also alleges that there is a statutory duty of a
magistrate to admonish witness under Rule 43 (F), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
"Upon motion of either party, the court shall
exclude from the courtroom any witness of the adverse party, so that he may not hear the testimony
of the other witnesses."
A close reading of both Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-12 (1953),
and Rule 43 (F), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, will show
that in neither statute can a statutory duty be found upon
the magistrate to admonish witnesses. At best, the magistrate's obligation rests with an exercise of his discretionary
power in such matters and in the instant case such an exercise was in favor of not admonishing the witnesses.
Whitely v. State, 418 P. 2d 164 (Wyo. 1966); State v.
Kendrick, 239 Ore. 512, 398 P. 2d 471 (1966); State v.
Denton, 101 Ariz. 455, 420 P. 2d 930 ( 1966).
However, appellant contends that even the failure to
admonish here was prejudicial error. Respondent submits
iL was not. Appellant seeks to impart same thread of collusion in testimony between plaintiff's attorney and witnesses during a conference at lunch on the morning of May
7, 1969. As the transcript will show (Tr. 58, 61, 62), no
discussion between plaintiff's attorney and witnesses was
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ePgaged in regarding Mr. Hill's testimony later that same
day

Consequently, for the above stated reasons, appellant's
allegation of prejudicial error is utterly without merit.
POINT IV.
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IS TO BE FOUND
IN THE JURY CHARGE.
Appellant erroneously contends that two statements
were made by the court in its instructions to the jury which
were prejudicial. A close examination of the jury charge
will show that neither of the statements were made to the
jury.
First, appellant claims that the court instructed the
jury in instruction numbered two, paragraph numbered
first, that, "A special right to possession is sufficient basis
to establish ownership." Nowhere in the above stated instruction or paragraph, or anywhere else in the jury in-structions, is such a statement to be found. What the court
did instruct in instruction numbered two and paragraph
numbered five was "and so the state must establish either
that Gary Hill was such owner or that he had some kind of
a special ownership or special right to possession of the
same so that it can be said that, for the purpose of a thief
or thievery, that he was the owner." (Emphasis added.)
Such an instruction, of course, does not, whatsoever, connote the same meaning as appellant's erroneously alleged
instruction. Borrelli v. State, 453 P. 2d 312 (Okla. 1969);
People v. Price, 46 C. A. 2d 59, 115 P. 2d 225 ( 1941).
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Second, the appellant contends that the court, in instruction numbered five, committed prejudicial enor in
stating "in fact, the evidence points to the contrary."
Again, a close reading of the jury instruction will bear out
the fact that no such instruction or comment was ever
made. Rather, the comment in question was stricken from
the instructions prior to the court's delivery of the said
instructions.
Consequently, appellant's contentions in his point IV
are erroneous and entirely without merit.
POINT V.
DENIAL BY THE COURT OF D E F E N S E
COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF
ACQUITTAL NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS PROPER.
Appellant's last point requires a two-part response.
He first contends that there was a break in the evidence leading to the conviction of defendant. As can be
sE=oen, however, from Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1 (1953), the
state did complete the chain of prima facie evidence of
guilt. The section reads:
"Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away the personal property of another. Possession of property recently
stolen, when the person in possession fails to make
a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence of guilt." (Emphasis ours.)
Consequently, the fact that respondent did show the
stolen property of Gary Hill (Tr. 7 5) to be in the posses-

of the defendant (Tr. 28) without satisfactory expla1rnt. •n as to ownership (Tr. 28), was prima facie evidence
uf guilt; to-wit, the inference that the defendant did commit
the larceny and that this inference with all other circumstances could be considered by the jury in determining
whether or not the defendant was beyond a reasonable
doubt guilty of such larceny. State v. Allred, 16 U. 2d 41,
395 P. 2d 535 (1964); State v. Wood, 2 U. 2d 34, 268 P. 2d
998 (1954).
:: 1·1t1

Appellant contends in his Point V that the information
as filed \Vas defective in that it failed to identify the appropriate name of the aggrieved party; to wit, the partnership name of Box Elder Meat Packing Company. From
this allegation, appellant contends that the respondent failed
tc make its proof in conformance with the alleged defective
information, since the stolen property may have been the
personal property of Mr. Hill's partner in the business.
However, it is easily seen that the information filed naming
the personal property as that of one Mr. Gary Hill, falls
directly within the purview of Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-17
(1953), which states:
"Whenever it is necessary in an information,
indictment, or bill of particulars, to make any averment as to or to describe any personal property belonging to several partners or owners, it is suf fi-

cient to refer to or describe such property as belonging to any one or more of such partners, without naming them all, or to state that anyone or more
of such partners or owners had a right of possession
of such property without naming them all." (Emphasis ours.)
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Therefore, the trial court's denial of appellant's motion
for judgment of acquittal, notwithstanding the verdict, was
proper and appellant's Point V is without merit.

CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing facts and authorities, the respondent respectfully submits that the appellant was not
denied any of the constitutional rights, that the court committed no prejudicial error, the defendant's motion was
properly denied and the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

